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THE ONTOLOGICAL CAUSATION 
Babu Thaliath♦ 
1. Mind-Body Problem 
The current debate on mind-brain reductionism brings about the 
resurgence – or Renaissance – of Cartesianism. This problem, which can 
in essence be subsumed not just under philosophy or psychology, but 
primarily under neurosciences, proves historically to be the culmination of 
mind-body dualism introduced by René Descartes in the modern 
philosophical discourse in the 17
th
 century. Descartes’ method to 
differentiate the mind, defined as a purely thinking and non extended 
substance (res cogitans), from the material and extended body (res 
extensa) is clearly an ontological attempt which became well-established 
in the history of Modern Philosophy as substance-ontological-dualism. 
The Cartesian dualism, postulated and substantiated in Meditations, is 
based on an epistemological differentiation between the recognizability of 
mind from that of body, as distinctively expressed in the method of doubt 
or negation (of all mental perceptions and attributes of bodies). If the mind 
can be separately identified as opposite to the body, this cognition rests 
eventually upon the irreducible ontic difference between mind and body.   
However, this epistemological differentiation does not refer to a 
spatial and temporal separation between mind and body, but implies a 
perfect distinction between these fundamental modes of existence. In 
short, we perceive the nature of the existence of mind completely different 
from the nature of bodily existence, since there exists an irreducible 
difference between the mode of being of the mind and that of the body. If 
Meditations attempts a perfect (epistemological and ontological) 
distinction between mind and body, it relates – in the Cartesian system – 
invariably to certain characteristic traits of these most fundamental modes 
of being (or existence). The primary and irreducible trait or attribute of the 
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body is pure extension; it is a res extensa, i.e., an extended substance, 
against which the mind is neither extended nor material. The mind, which 
is perfectly distinct from the body, is, therefore, a non extended and 
immaterial substance – a res cogitans.  
The Cartesian distinction between body and mind met with a few 
significant polemics in the 17
th
 century. If the mind has – as compared to 
the body – neither materiality nor extension, how can a union between 
mind and body, as revealed particularly in bodily volition, be materialized? 
Two of the prominent Cartesians who posed this question in their 
correspondence with Descartes were the Philosopher Pierre Gassendi 
(1592–1655) and the Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, daughter of King 
Friedrich V of Bohemia and Queen Elisabeth, a born Stuart. Descartes 
seemed to ignore Gassendi’s objection, but took the polemic of the 
princess into consideration:  
In October 1642 Descartes had learnt that Princess Elizabeth of 
Bohemia, in exile at the Hague, had read his Meditations with 
enthusiasm. He offered to visit her to explain any difficulties she 
encountered; but she put her questions in writing in a letter of 6 May 
1643. ‘How can the soul of man’, she asked, ‘being only a thinking 
substance, determine his bodily spirits to perform voluntary actions?’ 




Princess’ polemic relates clearly to a definite function of the mind, namely, 
the causation of volition as represented in the form of bodily movements; 
it equally relates to another function of the mind, namely, the sensory 
perceptions in which mental states are caused by bodily, i.e., physiological 
processes. Descartes recognizes how both these functions necessitate the 
union between mind and body. In his answer to Princess, Descartes 
differentiates the mental operation of thinking from that of sensation and 
volition where there is a clear union or nexus between mind and body, 
indicating thereby the existence of two distinct spheres of mind:  
There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the 
things we can know of its nature. The first is that it thinks; the second 
is that it is united to the body and can act and be acted upon along 
with it. About the second I have said hardly anything; I have tried 
only to make the first well understood. For, my principal aim was to 
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prove the distinction between soul and body and, to this end, only the 
first was useful, and the second might have been harmful. But 
because your Highness’ vision is so clear that nothing can be 
concealed from her, I will try now to explain how I conceive the 




2. The Causal Phenomena 
The union between mind and body, which characterizes the spheres or 
domains of sensory perceptions and volition, is principally – how we could 
derive from the polemics of Princess Elisabeth – a causal union. If in 
sensory perceptions the body forms the domain of causes and the mind the 
domain of effects, in volition this order of causation is reversed. 
How can this causal union or nexus between body and mind be 
differentiated from a normal causal nexus which we could easily identify 
in various disciplines of science, namely, Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, 
Physiology, etc.? We conceive the process of causation primarily as a 
temporal succession of causes and effects which altogether form natural 
phenomena. The principle of causality states that an effect necessarily 
follows a cause. In other words, every effect in nature can be traced back 
to a cause – or to a causal phenomenon. The entire etiological diagnostics 
in the field of physiological sciences are based on a causal principle, that 
every physiological symptom of a decease as effect can be traced back to a 
physiological or mere physical cause. The weather forecasts are concluded 
from empirically given causal phenomena in nature; from an empirically 
identified local or regional difference in atmospheric pressure, we are able 
to conclude that it will result into a hefty wind and eventually to a rain. 
In all these day to day phenomena, we could identify the elementary 
principle of causality. We are able to recognize without much difficulty, 
that the causation in these and similar natural phenomena constitutes a 
sufficient causation. A fundamental reason for the simplicity and 
sufficiency of these causal phenomena in the nature seems to be a domain 
of specific conformity between the spheres of effect and cause, as a result 
of which the causal processes take place within the context of a scientific 
discipline. The movements of billiard balls on a billiard board and their 
collisions are purely mechanical phenomena of causes and effects, i.e., 
they, as natural phenomena, can be identified within the context of 
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classical Newtonian Mechanics alone. In the same way, the pathological 
effects and causes belong to the scientific domain of Physiology whose 
object of study is restricted to the organic body. All these forms of causal 
nexus evolve within the physical world; they can be subsumed under the 
world of material objects. But the causal processes like the bodily 
causation of mental states and operations and the mental causation of 
bodily volition show an ontological difference – rather than an ontological 
conformity – between the domains of causes and effects. The “leap” from 
bodily causation to mental effects, i.e., to mental states and operations, is 
so enormous and distinct, that a causal nexus between these completely 
different domains of cause and effect appears to us a puzzle. 
We are confronted with the problem of mental causation of volition 
and bodily causation of mental states and operations, when we reduce 
these phenomena to their causes. In the above mentioned mechanical 
phenomena, the effects seem to be perfectly reduced to their causes, 
forming, thus, a sufficient causal reduction. In other words, in these and 
similar cases of a causal nexus (between effects and their causes) a 
sufficient causality is latent. A sufficient causal reduction of this nature 
cannot be ascribed to the mental causation of volition and the bodily 
causation of mental states and operations, because the sufficient or perfect 
causal reduction presupposes the ontological conformity between the 
domains of effects and causes. But there exists between mind and body an 
irresolvable ontic difference, i.e., a difference in their mode of being. In 
short, the nature of the reality of the mind is not identical with the nature 
of the reality of the body; they form absolutely different modes of 
existence. 
3. The Ontological Causation 
How can a mental reality be effectuated from a physical and material 
reality which has a clear ontic difference to it? This question is equally 
relevant to the mental causation of bodily volition. When we integrate the 
leap from bodily processes to mental states and operations in a causal 
nexus, this causal reduction implies – and is based on – a different mode of 
causality. The principle of causality states a necessary succession of causes 
and effects, all of which are temporal events or processes. The causal 
process is, therefore, a momentary phenomenon that connects similar 
momentary events of causes and effects. When the causation as an event 
ceases, it ceases also the event of its effect (or effectuation). As mere 
events, the causal processes and their effects in body and mind are subject 
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to this general principle of causality. The bodily causation of a mental state 
such as pain implies a causal nexus (or connectivity) between two different 
momentary events – in the domains of cause and effects. The mental 
causation of bodily volition can be similarly observed as a causal nexus 
between two momentary events of cause and effect. When the causal 
processes in these twofold causal nexus end or cease to exist, there occurs 
a cessation of their effects, namely the mental and bodily states and 
processes. 
When the irresolvable ontic difference between the mind and the 
body becomes a premise in various causal nexus between these two 
fundamental modes of existence, it presupposes and legitimizes a different 
form of causality. The ontic difference between the mind and the body, 
which makes a sufficient causal connectivity between these two absolute 
different modes of existence impossible, results, however, from a causal 
principle itself. As a mode of reality, the mind, i.e., the mental states and 
operations, is invariably caused by the neuronal processes in body. On the 
other hand, the mind causes reality of volition, i.e., bodily states and 
processes. In both these cases a form of being or existence evolves from a 
domain of reality which is fundamentally different from it. The mental 
phenomena are caused ontologically through bodily, i.e., neuronal 
phenomena and vice versa. Causation of this nature can, therefore, be 
called an ontological causation which, as a principle, underlies every 
causal nexus between the body and the mind. 
In the current discourse on brain-mind-identity which rehabilitates or 
historically reconstructs the old mind-body-problem, we could identify 
tendencies of causal-ontological reduction of mental states and processes 
to brain states, i.e., to different neuronal processes and structures. The 
identity theory (U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart and others) states that mental 
phenomena are nothing but certain neuronal phenomena (which causes 
them) in brain and in central nervous system; they are identical with them. 
Mental states and operations are basically cerebral phenomena as observed 
and analyzed in the science of Neurobiology. Peter Bieri, one of the major 
proponents of Analytical Philosophy of Mind in Germany, emphasizes 
with regard to the identity theory the ontological identity between mental 
and neurophysiologic states and operations. Such an identity, however, 
implies a perfect causal-ontological reduction of mental states to brain 
states. The effectuation of mental states and operations is fully ascribed to 
a neurophysiologic phenomenality. Consequently, the mental causation of 
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neurophysiologic states and processes can exist only in the form of 
physical – i.e., again neurophysiologic – phenomena. Thus, the identity 
theory presupposes a causal closure of physical, i.e., bodily phenomena. 
The Neurophysiology dominates the current discourse on the 
neuronal base of free will, especially in German academic circles; it 
clearly argues for the primacy of brain states and processes over the mental 
phenomena. The main proponents of this position are Wolf Singer, 
Gerhard Roth, and Wolfgang Prinz.
3
 All of them identify the mental 
causation as the foundation of free will, but reduce it to neuronal states and 
processes, i.e., to a neuronal causation within the context of 
Neurophysiology or Experimental Psychology. Accordingly, it is the brain 
alone and not ‘I’, i.e., my free will, which takes a decision. The self-
conscious subject, upon which the entire tradition of the philosophy of free 
will and all the ethical and political values and notions of societies are 
built, will then prove to be a mere construction or rather a mythos: 
Mir scheint der Satz »Nicht das Ich, sondern das Gehirn hat 
entschieden!« korrekt zu sein, denn »eine Entscheidung treffen« ist 
ein Vorgang, dessen Auftreten objektiv überprüfbar ist. Auf den 
linken oder rechten Knopf zu drücken oder (tatsächlich oder virtuell) 
durch eine linke oder rechte Tür zu gehen ist (oder benötigt) eine 
Entscheidung, und man kann mit entsprechendem Aufwand 
experimentell untersuchen, was im Gehirn passiert, bevor und wenn 
diese Entscheidung getroffen wird. Falls es nun stimmt, daß es nicht 
das wollende und bewußt erlebende Ich ist, welches die 
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The experimental base of these and similar arguments, which establish a 
causal primacy of brain over consciousness with regard to the free will, 
was the famous neurophysiologic experiment of Benjamin Libet (in the 
1970s). The Libetian experiment was originally based on an assumption 
that the measurable brain waves as causes temporally coincide with the 
bodily effects, i.e., the external behaviour of the test persons. This causal 
function of the brain and the nervous system is called the readiness 
potential. Through an experiment Libet could demonstrate that it is the 
readiness potential that is produced first before the test person takes a 
decision to act physically (in Libet’s experiment, pressing a button). In 
other words, between the development of readiness potential and its effect, 
namely, the free and conscious decision, a slight time-lag was observed. 
From this experiment the scientists of Neurophysiology tend to conclude 
that our free will, which we directly experience or of which we are 
immediately conscious, is a mere construction of our brain (since the 
volition always follows the development of readiness potential in a time-
lag). 
 This position, namely, the causal primacy of neurobiological 
processes over mental states and operations, is held in Anglo-American 
tradition amongst others by the Philosopher John Searle. Searle denotes his 
philosophy of mind as biological naturalism. In his Reith Lectures (held in 
1984 with the title, Minds, Brains and Science), Searle defends his basic 
notion of the causal primacy of brain processes which alone accomplish 
the various mental phenomena. “Mental phenomena, all mental 
phenomena whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, 
tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by 
processes going on in the brain”
5
 According to Searle, this causal 
reduction should resolve the Cartesian mind-body-dualism once and for 
all. I would argue, however, that this causal reduction is not a proposition 
which sufficiently resolves the problem of mind-body-dualism, i.e., how it 
was introduced in the modern philosophical discourse by Descartes and 
represented by many other philosophers in the post-Cartesian era. 
Descartes conceived the fundamental difference between the mind and the 
body in the form of an ontic difference between two absolutely different 
modes of being or existence. A mere causal reduction of mental states to 
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brain states would not be sufficient to overcome the ontic difference 
between these domains of effect and cause; moreover, an ontological 
reduction has to be postulated as the underlying principle of the theory of 
identity between mind and body. Therefore, in Searle’s thesis, the mind is 
reduced to a feature of brain – in the same manner how the properties like 
solidity of ice, fluidity of water or the gaseousness of steam form different 
features of one and the same substance, namely water (H2O): “Pains and 
other mental phenomena just are features of the brain (and perhaps the rest 
of the central nervous system).”
6
 
Based on this thesis, Searle explains how the material phenomenon 
of effect – as a state of reality – in certain cases can be observed as 
features of an elementary and substantial domain of cause:  
A common distinction in physics is between micro- and macro-
properties of systems – the small and large scales. Consider, for 
example, the desk at which I am now sitting, or the glass of water in 
front of me. Each object is composed of micro-particles. The micro-
particles have features at the level of molecules and atoms as well as 
at the deeper level of subatomic particles. But each object also has 
certain properties such as the solidity of the table, the liquidity of the 
water, and the transparency of the glass, which are surface or global 
features of the physical systems. Many such surface or global 
properties can be causally explained by the behaviour of elements at 
the micro-level. For example, the solidity of the table in front of me 
is explained by the lattice structure occupied by the molecules of 
which the table is composed. Similarly, the liquidity of the water is 
explained by the nature of the interactions between the H2O 
molecules. Those macro-features are causally explained by the 
behaviour of elements at the micro-level. 
 I want to suggest that this provides a perfectly ordinary model 
for explaining the puzzling relationships between the mind and the 
brain. In the case of liquidity, solidity, and transparency, we have no 
difficulty at all in supposing that the surface features are caused by 
the behaviour of elements at the micro-level, and at the same time we 
accept that the surface phenomena just are features of the very 
system in question. I think the clearest way of stating this point is to 
say that the surface feature is both caused by the behaviour of micro-
elements, and at the same time is realized in the system that is made 
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up of the micro-elements. There is a cause and effect relationship, but 
at the same time the surface features are just higher level features of 




Searle shows in the above cited examples how the surface features at 
macro level of a phenomenon can be caused by elements and their 
structures at micro level. Through these examples Searle attempts an 
analogy between the causation of the surface features solidity, fluidity or 
gaseousness through various molecular structures at a micro-level and the 
causation of mind through brain (which is at a micro-level). When Searle – 
in analogy to the material states of solidity or fluidity – identifies the 
mental states as surface features of brain, it implies clearly a causal and 
ontological reduction. Such a (causal-ontological) reduction forms the 
essential feature of an analytical method in which the reality of a complex 
and composite phenomenon is traced back to the causality of elementary 
substances or phenomena and their structures. But when we reverse the 
order of these and similar cases of causal nexus, we will reach at a rather 
synthetic process in which elementary substances and their structures 
ontologically cause higher, i.e., more complex phenomenal and mental 
realities. The manner in which the solidity of ice is caused by the lattice 
structure of water molecules, or the mental states and operations is caused 
by neuronal states and processes, forming various instances of an 
ontological causation. 
The processes in brain which cause mental states and operations are 
not only physiological, i.e., neuronal, but also electromagnetic and 
chemical. The synapse which connects the neurons contains a messenger 
which functions as electro transmitter. Therefore, the causation of mental 
states and operations through these processes cannot be subsumed merely 
under a unique neuronal causation. Various physical processes, which form 
an integral part of neuronal causation, are to be taken into account. These 
processes belong to different domains of physical phenomenality. The 
electrical processes in brain and in central nervous system can be 
functionally or mere operationally subject to the science of Neurobiology, 
but it differentiates itself in its ontic status from neurons which are organic 
and form, as such, most of the brain cells. While neurons – as organic cells 
– belong to the scientific domain of Biology, the chemical and electro-
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chemical phenomena in brain and in central nervous system are subject to 
the domain of other inorganic domains of Chemistry and Physics, i.e., 
Electro-mechanics. The chemical reactions in brain consist of molecular 
and atomic processes; electrons, which are subatomic particles, form the 
base of electrical processes. In this way, we could identify in neuronal 
causation of mental states and operations an ontic progression from an 
elementary physical phenomenality, as represented by the subatomic 
particles, atomic elements, molecular (inorganic and organic) compounds, 
biological and cellular neurons, etc., which altogether form the 
constituents of neuronal processes. 
 We have defined the neurobiological causation of mental states and 
operations as an ontological causation, in which the reality of a higher or 
more complex mode of being evolves from the causation of elementary 
modes of being. However, we could identify in the entire ontic structure of 
phenomenal reality different forms and structures of analogous ontological 
causation. The subatomic particles, namely electrons, protons and 
neutrons, cause ontologically the being or existence of atomic elements, 
e.g., Hydrogen, Oxygen, Carbon or Mercury. At a higher level the atomic 
elements cause – in different molecular structures – the inorganic and 
organic compounds, e.g., Water (H2O), Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane 
(CH4), etc. The ontological causation of molecular (organic and inorganic) 
compounds underlies the existence of biological phenomena, e.g., the 
cellular DNA, Proteins, Neurons, etc. The neurobiological causation of 
mental states and operations consists of a chain of ontological causations 
which are latent in the ontic (phenomenal) structure of reality. 
4. Ontological Causation as Substantial and Structural Causation 
Now, we examine how the ontological causation is different from our 
common notion of causality, conceived as a necessary temporal succession 
of events of causes and effects. Which are the fundamental features that 
demarcate the ontological causation from the normal momentary causal 
processes in nature? Within the domain of physical phenomena the 
ontological causation of elementary and substantial modes of being forms 
in principle a substantial causation from which the reality or existence of a 
more complex substance evolves. Therefore, the primary feature of the 
ontological causation is that it is a substantial causation. Electrons, protons 
and neutrons are elementary substances which altogether cause 
ontologically the material substantiality of atomic chemical elements. At a 
higher level, these atomic elements (H, O, N, C, etc.) cause – in different 
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molecular structures – a great diversity of inorganic and organic 
compounds of which our physical reality is composed. New compounds 
are produced in a chemical reaction between two or more inorganic 
compounds; this process is nothing but a causal-substantial restructuring of 
the atomic elements which are underlying the compounds, for example, 
H2SO4 + CaCO3 → CaSO4 + H2O + CO2. 
Just as the substantial causation of atomic elements underlies the 
original compounds, the resulting new compounds evolve from an 
analogous ontological, i.e., substantial causation of the same atomic 
elements. A great diversity of organic compounds, which form the basic 
components of the biological phenomena, evolves from a few inorganic 
and atomic elements, namely Hydrogen, Oxygen, Carbon, Nitrogen, etc. In 
other words, the ontological-substantial causation of a few atomic 
elements underlies the reality or existence of all the organic compounds. In 
an ontic structure of reality, we could identify such ontological-substantial 
causation up to the neuronal causation of mental states and operations. The 
brain and the central nervous system which is connected to it have 
essentially a material-substantial phenomenality. That they cause – in 
different neuronal structures and processes – the immaterial, i.e., non-
substantial mental states and operations, can be effectively conceived 
within the parameters of an ontological-substantial causation (which, as 
effectuation of irreducible mental states, forms a limiting mode of 




The ontological causation has in addition to the substantial a 
structural base. The elementary modes of being cause the reality of a more 
complex mode of being or existence not only substantially, but also 
structurally. The chemical elements evolve from different atomic structures 
of subatomic particles (electron, proton and neutron).  Figure 1 shows the 
structure of an atom of the chemical element Hydrogen. It consists of an 
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electron and a nucleus with only one proton. Considering the electrons 
which rotate in an orbit around a nucleus, this and similar structures of 
atomic elements can be described as dynamic structures. In this way, 
different atomic elements evolve ontologically from a substantial as well 
as from a structural base of elementary subatomic particles, i.e., the 
existence or reality of atomic elements is substantially and structurally 
caused by the subatomic particles – electrons, protons and neutrons – 
which form in this ontological causation the elementary modes of being. 
Thus, the ontological causation (which underlies the existence of every 
mode of reality) includes both substantial and structural causation of 
elementary modes of being. The same elementary substances, i.e., the 
subatomic particles in different quantities and structural forms cause 
ontologically a great diversity of atomic elements; this plainly explains 
how within the overall phenomenon of ontological causation a substantial 
causation correlates with a structural causation. 
The structural causation can be identified at all the levels of the ontic 
structure of physical or phenomenal reality. The atoms of chemical 
elements combine in different molecular structures resulting in inorganic 
and organic compounds. The molecular-structural causation is clearly 
established in various organic compounds. Few inorganic elements, 
namely, Hydrogen, Carbon, Oxygen, Nitrogen, or Phosphorous, are 
combined in molecular structures which bring about most of the organic 
compounds. The carbohydrates have more or less the same substantial 
base, namely, the inorganic elements Hydrogen, Carbon and Oxygen, but 
they are different from one another with respect to their molecular 
structures. A simple organic compound like Methane has its molecular 
structure with four atoms of Hydrogen and a single atom of Carbon. 
However, a molecule of Methane evolves not just from a substantial base, 
but clearly from a definite spatial structure as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
The existence of a Methane molecule is here materialized through a 
structural causation of elementary inorganic atoms of Hydrogen and 
Carbon. The phenomenon of isomers shows how different organic 
compounds with identical substantial base (of a few inorganic elements) 
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evolve solely from different molecular structures. Isomers are organic 
compounds consisting identical chemical elements in different molecular 
structures. Hence, they form the best examples for structural causation 
which, along with substantial causation, constitute the ontological 
causation.
8
 Beyond this domain of organic compounds – at the highest 
level in the ontic structure of reality – we see how the neuronal structures 
cause different mental states and operations. Neurons are biological cells 
which are composed mostly of organic compounds. Here we could observe 
how different mental states and operations emerge from different 
structures of substantially identical neurons. 
In all the above discussed cases of ontological causation, a 
substantial causation correlates with a structural causation, in consequence 
of which a higher and more complex mode of being or existence is 
ontologically caused by elementary modes of being. Ontological causation 
of this nature (where there is a clear correlation between a substantial and 
structural causation) will, thus, always result into an escalation or rise of 
the mode of being or existence from the domain of cause to that of effect. 
However, such an ontological escalation of the mode of being seems to be 
determined predominantly through a substantial causation. In certain cases 
of mechanical phenomena, the ontological causation consists solely of a 
structural causation. The different physical states of a material body, 
namely, the solidity, fluidity and gaseousness, as well as certain material 
properties like transparency are ontologically caused through various 
molecular structures alone. The solid ice, the liquid water and the gaseous 
steam are substantially identical – i.e., all these physical states consist of 
identical water molecules – but they differ in their molecular structure. 
Here we can not trace the ontological status of different physical states to a 
substantial causation, since the domain of cause and the domain of effect 
are substantially identical. The physical states of solidity, fluidity and 
gaseousness and the material properties like transparency are solely caused 
by different molecular structures of the same material. In short, certain 
                                               
8
Following figure (Figure 3) shows the structures of the isomers Cyclohexane 
(C6H12) and 1- Hexane (C6H12). 
 
46 Babu Thaliath  
 
physical states and material properties result from a structural causation 
which does not necessitate a correlation with a substantial causation. 
Water molecules are mere components of ice, water and steam; they 
do not form elementary substances which ontologically, i.e., substantially, 
cause these physical states of one and the same material. A structural 
causation alone forms here the ontological causation, since there is no 
ontological-substantial difference between the domains of cause and 
effect. In other words, since there is no rise or escalation of the mode of 
being, which is to be caused ontologically through elementary modes of 
being, the structural causation occurs here within the context of a scientific 
discipline, namely the Mechanics. This mechanical-structural causation 
forms the basis of Strength of Materials, an important discipline of 
Engineering Mechanics. The sheer resistance of a footing made of steel or 
of reinforced cement concrete, the tensile strength a steel rope, density of a 
metal or viscosity of a fluid, bending moment of a beam, etc., are 
mechanical properties which can be causally traced back to different 
molecular structures of the material, or which are caused by substantially 
identical molecular structures alone. 
5. Ontological Causation as Constant Causation 
We have discussed the ordinary notion of causality in many of our day to 
day situations, which can be observed as a temporal succession of causes 
and effects. The causes and events in such causal nexus form momentary 
events. The causal events lead to effects, as long as they last or persist. 
However, certain effects in the form of physical states such as wetness on 
the surface of a road which persists even if the cause, say the rain, ceases. 
The dryness of the road surface and the leaves of trees are then caused by 
the sunshine and atmospheric evaporation. All of these causal processes 
are momentary events which are characterized by a temporal succession 
and finality of causes and effects. In contrast to it the ontological causation 
constitutes a constant causation. Within the context of ontological 
causation a constant (ontological) causation of elementary modes of being 
underlies every mode of existence as represented in an ontic structure of 
reality. Both the substantial and the structural causation form, in this 
manner, a constant ontological causation. If the elementary subatomic 
particles – electrons, protons and neutrons – ontologically cause the 
existence and reality of an atom, this casual nexus is characterized through 
a constant causation, i.e., a constant coexistence of reality and causality in 
the material existence of an atom. Similarly, the constant ontological 
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causation of inorganic elements is latent in the material existence and 
reality of organic compounds. The above discussed mechanical-structural 
causation of molecules, which brings about the physical states and 
properties like solidity, fluidity, gaseousness, transparency, etc., also refers 
to a form of constant ontological-structural causation which safeguard the 
existential constancy of these physical states. 
Now a decisive question can be asked: Can we denote the nexus 
between the mental reality and its bodily-neuronal causality in terms of a 
constant causation? In other words, is consciousness a constant mental 
reality in which an equally constant neuronal causality is immanent? 
Before answering this question we will try to discuss some of the essential 
characteristics of the phenomenon of constant causation. In case of 
momentary causal connections we experience in our day to day life, the 
effects are seemingly brought about through sufficient causal events. That 
is to say, the effects can be perfectly reduced to causal events. The wetness 
of roads or leaves is sufficiently caused by the rainfall. (Apart from the fact 
that the subjective experience of wetness evolves from the bodily 
causation of mental states). The movements of billiard balls on a billiard 
board (a classical example of causal nexus which is referred quite often) 
follow the principles of Classical Mechanics which is based on axiomatic 
propositions of sufficient causal nexus (of mechanical causes and effects). 
Already the first principles of classical Newtonian Mechanics imply a 
causal adequacy of certain fundamental natural phenomena. The law of 
inertia implies an adequate or sufficient causal nexus between an effect, 
namely, the linear and uniform movement of a body in free space, and a 
causal mechanical principle, namely the inertial tendency of a body to 
continue its movement linearly and uniformly. Similarly, a sufficient 
causal nexus between effect and cause underlies the law of action and 
reaction.  
In all these examples of mechanical phenomena the effects and their 
causes occur within the context of the Science of Mechanics. That is to 
say, a contextual conformity can be identified between the domains of 
effect and cause. This also implies that in mechanical causations the 
domains of effect and cause can be subsumed under a unitary scientific 
domain of being. Similar contextual, i.e., ontological conformity between 
the domains of effect and cause can be observed in other scientific 
disciplines like Chemistry, Physics, Physiology, Geology, etc. The 
adequacy of causal nexus within the contextuality of these etiological 
48 Babu Thaliath  
 
sciences is, therefore, based on a principle or a prerequisite which states 
that the effects and their causes occur in a unitary scientific domain of 
being (or, in other words, there exists an ontological-contextual conformity 
between the domains of causes and effects). 
Such an ontological (or ontological-contextual) conformity between 
the domains of effects and causes cannot be found in cases of ontological 
constant causations. The ontological causation – in the form of substantial 
and structural causation – brings about a rise or escalation of the mode of 
being or reality between causes and effects. As compared to the atomic 
chemical elements the subatomic particles – which cause them 
ontologically, i.e., substantially and structurally – have an entirely different 
mode of being or reality.
9
 The rise or escalation of the mode of being in the 
ontological causation can be identified most clearly and distinctively when 
neurons cause the mental states and operations which are completely 
different in their ontological status from the physical phenomena (to which 
the neuronal causation belongs). In these and similar cases of ontological 
causal nexus, in which a higher and more complex mode of being or 
reality is constantly caused by elementary modes of being, a clear ontic 
difference between the reality and its (ontological) causality is to be 
observed. From the subatomic particles up to the evolution of 
consciousness, the ontic structure of reality is characterized – at its 
different levels – always by a constant coexistence of causal and 
elementary modes of being and their effectuation of the reality of higher 
and more complex modes being, between which an irreducible ontic 
difference exists.  
6. The Sufficient and Insufficient (Ontological) Causation 
Another equally important feature of the ontological causation is that it 
forms in most of the cases an insufficient causation. The ontological 
causation connects in a causal nexus two different domains of being 
between which mostly a rise or escalation of the mode of being – from 
causal to effectuated states – is to be observed. This rise in the mode or 
status of being implies a clear ontic inconformity between the domains of 
cause and effect (or between ontological causality and reality), because of 
which the causation seems to be insufficient or inadequate. The subatomic 
particles, electrons, protons and neutrons, cause ontologically the existence 
                                               
9
The mode of being or reality can also be denoted as mode of existence of 
physical phenomena or mental states and operations. Accordingly, the ontological 
causation forms invariably an existential causation.  
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of various atomic chemical elements. But these elements, e.g., hydrogen, 
carbon, mercury, etc., are not mere combinations of the subatomic 
particles in different atomic structures. Similarly, the inorganic and organic 
compounds cannot be ontologically reduced to atomic elements which 
constitute them in different molecular structures. The insufficient 
ontological causation can be most distinctively identified in neuronal 
causation of mental states and operations, since at this level of the ontic 
structure of reality two absolutely different domains of being, namely, the 
purely mental and purely physical phenomena, are connected in an 
ontological causal nexus.  
Compared to this and similar insufficient ontological-substantial 
causations, the ontological-structural causation of physical states and 
qualities, e.g., solidity, fluidity, gaseousness, transparency as well as the 
properties like the tensile strength or sheer force of steel structures (as 
discussed above), implies a sufficient ontological causation. In these cases 
there exists an ontic conformity between the reality (of physical states) and 
the constant ontological causality which is latent in it. Since there is no 
ontic difference between the domains of cause and effect, the reality of 
these physical states and its qualities can be perfectly reduced to the 
ontological, i.e., structural and substantial causation of the molecules. We 
could, therefore, rightly state that the solid ice and the gaseous steam are 
nothing but water. But such an ontological-causal reduction would not be 
possible if we, thereby, cross the limits of the mode of being which 
characterizes the physical reality of material. We cannot – in an analogous 
manner – declare that water is nothing but H2O, a mere structural 
combination of two atoms of Hydrogen and one atom of Oxygen, because 
the reality of the substance water has almost nothing common with the 
reality of its elementary-atomic components. Similarly, we cannot simply 
state that an atom of Hydrogen is nothing but a mere structural 
combination of an electron revolving around a nucleus consisting of one 
proton, or the numerous organic compounds are nothing but different 
molecular-structural combinations of a few inorganic elements, namely, 
Hydrogen, Carbon, Oxygen, Nitrogen, Phosphorous, etc.   
The insufficient ontological causation is, therefore, most precisely 
determined through the absence of an ontic conformity between the 
domains of cause and effect. In other word, the insufficient ontological 
causation presupposes an irreducible ontic difference between the reality 
and its ontological causality. When we reduce the solidity of a body to a 
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definite substantial and unitary molecular structure, we declare the reality 
of this physical state to be perfectly dependent on an ontological-structural 
causality which constantly underlies the state of solidity. However, most of 
the manifestations of ontological causation in nature do not presuppose 
such a perfect ontological-causal dependency of reality on an elementary 
and constant causality. The reality of water (H2O) is only to some extent 
ontologically dependent on the reality of its atomic constituents, Hydrogen 
and Oxygen. That is to say, the reality of this molecular substance is to 
some extent independent of the ontological causality of its atomic 
constituents. Similarly, the reality of numerous organic compounds is to 
some degree independent of the ontological causality of its atomic 
constituents. This ontological-causal independence of the reality can be 
most clearly and distinctively identified in the neuronal causation of 
mental states and operations. The reality of sensory perceptions, 
imagination, or verbal thinking seems to be remarkably independent of the 
reality of the neurons which cause them ontologically. Therefore, the 
statement, ‘mental states and operations are nothing but neuronal states 
and processes’, proves to be highly inconsistent. This principle of 
ontological-causal independence imparts every (physical and mental) 
mode of reality its autonomy, to be more precise, an existential autonomy 
from the ontological causation of elementary modes of being which 
underlies it constantly. 
As a result of the insufficient ontological causation or the 
ontological-causal independence, every mode of being in the ontic 
structure of reality appears to attain a distinctively autonomous reality – a 
reality in itself. This autonomy of a mode of being or reality is essentially 
supplemented with its uniqueness and finality. According to this principle, 
every mode of being – subatomic particles, atomic elements, molecular 
(inorganic and organic) compounds, biological cells, etc., forms an 
autonomous reality in itself. They are unique, because they remain 
unchanged or retain their mode of reality in all the atomic, molecular or 
biological structures. The same or identical subatomic particles constitute 
all the atomic elements. Similarly, the few identical inorganic elements (H, 
O, C, N, etc.) constitute a great variety of organic compounds. The modes 
of being or reality are also final states, because the existence of every 
mode of being indicates an intangible limit of phenomenality; every mode 
of being is a final state or form of existence in itself.    
The autonomy, uniqueness, and finality form, therefore, the 
fundamental characteristics of every mode of being in the ontic structure 
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of reality. These characteristics remain intact both in the reality of every 
mode of being and in the (ontological) causality of the elementary modes 
of being. They are based, on the one hand, on the insufficient ontological-
substantial causality and, on the other, on the irreducible ontic difference 
between the domains of cause and effect (which underlies the insufficient 
ontological causality). The greater the ontic difference between the 
domains of cause and effect in the ontological causation becomes, the 
more clear and distinct appear these features of a mode of being. The 
existence and qualities of chemical (atomic) elements have attained a 
unique, autonomous and final state of reality in itself which cannot be 
ontologically reduced to the existence and qualities of the subatomic 
particles. Similarly, the reality of organic compounds differentiates itself 
distinctively from the reality of the inorganic atomic elements which 
constitute them. Every mode of being attains, as shown in these and 
similar cases, an unknown fact of reality in itself which cannot be reduced 
to the ontological causation of elementary modes of being. However, all 
these modes of being can be subsumed under a general category of 
physical phenomena. But when the mental states and operations are 
ontologically caused by neuronal structures and processes, we could 
identify a perfect ontic transition from the mode of being in the domain of 
cause and in the domain of effect. Such an ontic transition also indicates a 
perfect ontic difference between these domains of reality. As effects, the 
mental states and operations are closely characterized by their perfect ontic 
difference from the neuronal causation. Consequently, the reality of mental 
or conscious states and processes prove themselves in contrast to the 
causal phenomenality of neuronal states and structures to be most 
distinctively autonomous. Such an existential autonomy of purely mental 
reality is necessarily supplemented with an existential uniqueness and 
finality of the highest degree.  
We have discussed the constant coexistence of reality and causality 
in ontological causation. The constancy of the ontological-causal nexus 
safeguards the existential constancy of the reality in itself whose 
fundamental characteristics we identify in every mode of being as the 
existential autonomy, unity and finality. At the level of the bodily 
causation of mental states and operations, the constant neuronal causation 
should result into a constant autonomous existence of consciousness. This 
appears to be in contradiction with the commonly observed momentary 
causation of mental states and operations. All mental states and processes, 
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namely, the sensation, perception, thinking, imagination, etc., are 
momentary events which are brought about through momentary neuronal 
causations; i.e., they are initiated by neuronal processes and can persist, 
only as long as they are being caused. If we consider this momentary 
neuronal causation of mental states and operations alone, we could only 
reach a conclusion that the mind is a mere composition or rather 
summation of all our momentary mental states and operations. In other 
words, the existence of consciousness is solely based on the existence of 
momentary mental states and operations. However, the neuronal causation 
as ontological causation also forms a constant existential causation out of 
which a constant existential reality of mind and its fundamental 
characteristics, namely, the existential autonomy, unity, and finality should 
evolve. That is to say, the neurons cause not only the momentary mental 
states and processes, but also, primarily, the constant and autonomous 
existence of mind. In this way, the totality of our mind appears to be 
grounded on a twofold ontological-neuronal causation; the mind attains – 
with respect to the momentary and constant ontological-neuronal causation 
– a dual form of existence as represented by the existential constancy of 
mind and the momentary mental states and operations. 
7. The Mental Causation 
The momentary neuronal causation – although its effects, namely, the 
mental states and operations, are bestowed with a reality in itself 
(independent of the physical phenomenality of the brain) – forms 
eventually not a perfect existential but a rather functional or mere 
operational base of consciousness. In contrast, the constant ontological-
neuronal causation appears to create and safeguard a primary mode of 
existence of mind which need not be supported by momentary neuronal 
causations. It would be interesting to observe how this twofold causation 
of mind and mental states and operations is significant in analyzing the 
mental causation of bodily volition. This reversed mode of causation, as 
compared to the neuronal causation of mind, remains a puzzle. Both these 
modes of causal nexus relate to a necessary interaction between body and 
mind, which forms the most fundamental aspect of the mind-body-
problem – since it was introduced in the modern philosophical discourse 
by René Descartes. However, the mental causation of bodily volition 
appears to be more complex than the neuronal causation of mental states 
and operations. 
Journal of Dharma 33, 1 (January-March 2008) 
The Ontological Causation  
53 
 
 The puzzle of mental causation, as represented in current discourses 
on the causal connectivity between mind and brain, is based ultimately on 
the problem of initiation, to be more precise, on the problem of causal 
initiations of volition, i.e., the acts of free will. We are conscious of the 
fact that we alone initiate all our acts of free will – in terms of thinking and 
volition. That is to say, it is our mind alone that brings about all our acts of 
thinking and volition originally and causally. In reality, however, all our 
mental operations are caused by neuronal states and processes in brain. A 
primary neuronal causation should necessarily underlie the mental 
causation which appears to initiate a chain of bodily causal connections – 
from neuronal causation to the mechanical effects, i.e., movements of the 
body. This will result evidently into a (logical-epistemological) vicious 
circle in the form a hard-wired system. Many Neurobiologists argue, based 
on this problem that it is not ‘I’, the subject, but the brain alone causes or 
causally initiates all the free acts of mind. I, however, feel that ‘I’, i.e., my 
mind alone, initiates all my free acts of thinking and volition. When I take 
a decision against all the valid and sufficient grounds which support a 
particular strategic undertaking, I act freely and autonomously. But the 
decision of my mind appears to be primarily caused or causally initiated by 
a neuronal process in my brain. This brings me into a difficult situation in 
which I have to ask myself the question, ‘who decides?’ ‘I’, i.e., my mind 
or my brain! 
The mental causation will remain a puzzle, as long as we conceive 
our subjectivity as a totality of all our momentary perceptive and 
aperceptive states and operations (as represented in various modes of 
sensation, thinking, imagination, etc.). The momentary neuronal causation 
which brings about mental states and operations is normally an irreversible 
causal process, in which an effect should temporally follow a cause. We 
have, however, identified within the causal nexus between brain and mind 
a twofold, i.e., momentary and constant causation. Accordingly, the subject 
is not just a mere totality or synthesis of all momentary mental states and 
operations which are caused through (momentary) neuronal processes in 
brain; instead, it evolves primarily from a constant ontological causation in 
which the neuronal states and processes in brain, as elementary modes of 
physical being or reality, constantly cause the existence and reality of 
mind in a perfect ontic transition (as discussed above). We have seen how 
such a constant ontological causation can be identified at different levels 
of an ontic structure of reality. Through the constant ontological causation 
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every mode of being or reality attains its existential autonomy, unity and 
finality, irrespective of the nature of the elementary modes of being which 
cause this particular mode of being ontologically and constantly. The 
constant ontological causation has its most appropriate expression in the 
creation of mind, since the mind as effect evolves in a perfect ontic 
transition from neuronal causation (through which the mental states and 
operations develop distinctively their autonomy, uniqueness, and finality). 
In this way, the mind appears to have a primary and constant mode of 
existence (or reality) which distinguishes it from all the secondary and 
momentary modes of mental existence, as represented by all forms of 
momentary mental states and processes of thinking, perception, 
imagination, etc. This primary and constant reality of mind appears, 
furthermore, to establish the deepest foundation of our consciousness and 
also of our unconscious states and operations. The initiation of all the acts 
of free will could, therefore, be conceived as the accomplishment of this 
primary and thoroughly autonomous mode of existence of the mind. ‘I’ 
experience such an initiation directly, compared to all other uncontrollable 
neuronal causations of mental states and operations. For example, all 
bodily and outer-bodily sensations are finally initiated through neuronal 
processes. I should perceive the colour and sound of external, i.e., outer-
bodily objects, the pain or the taste in my body, etc., how they are brought 
about through a chain of causal connections – from mechanical, chemical 
or electro-chemical to neuronal causations; I cannot change my sensations 
in my immediate perceptive experience. As opposed to this, I experience 
my thinking and volition to be acts of my free will; I can form and control 
them how I want them to be. I identify my free will in principle not just in 
the course of my free acts of thinking and volition, but more precisely in 
the constant initiation of these conscious processes in my mind. Such an 
experience of free mental initiation (of thinking and volition) cannot be 
brought about through mere neuronal states and processes. This leads to 
the conclusion that the primary realm of my subjectivity, which evolves 
from a constant ontological-neuronal causation and attains, as such, the 
most perfect autonomy (i.e., ontological-causal independence from an 
elementary and phenomenal causality of neuronal processes in brain), 
initiates even the neuronal causations of the acts of my free will. 
This most primary mental initiation of free will and its acts (thinking 
and volition) is a necessary condition for my direct and immediate 
experience of my free will in my mind. If, as opposed to this, all my acts 
of thinking and volition are caused merely through neuronal processes, I 
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cannot experience them in my mind as acts of my free will. In this case, 
the origin of my free thinking and volition becomes similar to the neuronal 
causation of my sensory perceptions which I cannot control subjectively. 
Moreover, I cannot act freely – verbally and bodily – if all my acts of 
thinking and volition are entirely initiated through neuronal processes in 
my brain alone; I would, in this case, act like a robot which can only 
function mechanically. Both sensation, which are finally initiated through 
neuronal processes, and the mental initiation of thinking and volition occur 
in the realm of mind, the existence of which as a distinct mode of reality 
and its perfect autonomy from the physical phenomenality of the brain 
form a necessity. It is this realm of my existence which connects my brain, 
a gray stuff hidden in my skull, with the world outside. If all my mental 
states and operations are initiated and caused merely through neuronal 
processes, I, strictly speaking, don’t need my mind as a distinct and 
necessary realm of my existence (in other words, this condition makes my 
mind existentially superfluous). In this situation, I need my eyes and ears 
not for seeing and hearing, but just for receiving the light rays and sound 
waves reflected from external objects, which then eventually create retinal 
images and the vibrations of the eardrum – the sole inputs of neuronal 
processes underlying the faculties of vision and hearing. Similarly, I don’t 
need the realm of a logical subjectivity – in order to consciously think, 
remember, or imagine – as all these operations can be entirely initiated and 
carried forth by my brain alone. In short, if the initiation of all the mental 
states and operations is restricted to the phenomenality of the brain alone, 
it does not necessitate the realm of mind as a perfectly distinct and 
autonomous mode of existence. 
The immediately experienced operations of conscious thinking and 
volition indicate a realm of mind which has a perfect autonomy from the 
realm of brain, and on which all the conscious states and operations of the 
will are based. The existence of such a realm – or mode of reality – has a 
definite function which surpasses the extent of ontological-neuronal 
causation in brain. The subjective experience of my freedom of thinking 
and volition is primarily anchored in this realm of my mind. If all my 
bodily and outer-bodily sensations as well as my acts of thinking, 
imagination, volition, etc., can be perfectly reduced to mere neuronal 
processes in brain, I could still, even without my subjectivity, appear to be 
a normal human being. My self, however, will be devoid of consciousness; 
in other words, I will never experience that ‘I’ as a conscious being exists. 
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Since I experience all my subjective operations – sensation, perception, 
thinking, imagination, etc., – within myself, I conclude that the realm of 
my mind, which reveals a clear ontic difference from the realm of my 
brain and body, proves to be an existential necessity. This necessity clearly 
indicates that the initiation of my conscious acts of thinking and volition 
(which can be subsumed under my free will) is not established primarily 
through momentary neuronal processes in my brain, but it occurs in a 
constantly effectuated realm of my mind which, as compared to the 
physical phenomenality of the brain, form a perfectly autonomous, unique 
and final mode of reality. A constant neuronal causation underlies this 
reality of my mind. It, however, constitutes an ontically different, i.e., 
autonomous mode of existence which constantly safeguards the existence 
of my subjectivity or my consciousness, in short, my immediate 
experience that I am.
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